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Abstract
It’s plausible to think that we’re rationally required to follow our
total evidence. It’s also plausible to think that there are coherence re-
quirements on rationality. It’s also plausible to think that higher-order
evidence can be misleading. Several epistemologists have recognized
the puzzle these claims generate, and the puzzle seems to have only
startling and unattractive solutions that involve the rejection of intu-
itive principles. Yet Alex Worsnip (Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, forthcoming) has recently argued that this puzzle has a tidy,
attractive, and independently motivated solution that involves reject-
ing the claim that we’re rationally required to follow our total evidence.
In what follows I argue that this solution fails to solve the fundamental
problem for rationality.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to the Inquiry referees for
valuable feedback that greatly improved this paper.
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1 Evidence and Coherence: the Apparent Con-
flict
Many epistemologists have regarded it as a platitude of epistemic rational-
ity that it requires one’s doxastic attitude towards a proposition–henceforth
‘D(p)’–to track one’s total evidence.1 Here’s Worsnip’s (forthcoming) way of
capturing this thought:
Evidential Requirement (ER). If S’s total evidence sup-
ports D(p), then rationality requires of S that she takes D(p).2
(ER) leads only to a very weak version of evidentialism. This is for two rea-
sons. First, it leaves room for rational beliefs that are not based on evidence.
So evidence is not necessary for rational belief. Second, (ER) is neutral on
the nature of evidence. So it’s not only internalist evidentialists who have
a stake in this evidentialist principle, but anyone who thinks our attitudes
ought to track our evidence. For both these reasons (ER) is consistent with
a wide range of positions in epistemology.
(ER) is an extremely intuitive thesis. Suppose you study the history of
Europe and all your evidence supports believing that Napoleon won many
battles but lost a war. It is rational for you to believe that, and not believing
that would be irrational. It’s hard to imagine cases where one’s total evidence
supports believing p though one can rationally not believe p. Even if an
epistemologist insisted that there are some cases where it’s rational to resist
one’s total evidence, they should still insist that it’s not always rational to
do so. And that’s enough to get the puzzle going.
1‘D(p)’ is taken to range only over the coarse-grained attitudes of belief, disbelief, and
suspension, and no uniqueness thesis is assumed. As Worsnip (forthcoming) points out,
this way of setting things up allows us to avoid unnecessary and distracting technicalities
in the assessment of the core philosophical problem to follow. See section I of his paper
for further caveats and cautionary notes.
2For defense of this sort of principle see Conee and Feldman (2004) and Lasonen-Aarnio
(forthcoming).
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Many epistemologists have maintained that rationality requires one to be
coherent in at least the following sense:
Inter-Level Coherence (ILC). Rationality requires that:
(i) S believes that her total evidence supports D(p) only if she
takes D(p); and
(ii) S believes that her total evidence does not support D(p) only
if she does not take D(p).3
On the surface (ER) and (ILC) seem to gel quite nicely, expressing two
distinct yet plausible principles concerning the demands of epistemic ratio-
nality. (ER) tells one to follow her evidence; (ILC) tell one to avoid akratic
pairs of attitudes. Yet the puzzle surfaces with the possibility of misleading
higher-order evidence. Take higher-order evidence to be evidence about what
one’s evidence supports. Like virtually all evidence, it seems possible that
higher-order evidence can be misleading. That is:
Possibility of Iterative Failure (PIF). It is possible
that:
(i) S’s total evidence supports D(p); and
(ii) S’s total evidence supports believing that her total evidence
does not support D(p).4
I will give an intuitive case in which (PIF)(i) and (ii) obtain below. But apart
from that I will not be defending (PIF). I have nothing to add to existing
defenses of (PIF)–or (ILC) or (ER) for that matter. My primary aim is to
demonstrate that rejecting (ER) will not resolve the central problem.
3See Worsnip (forthcoming) for a recent defense of this. For others who support (ILC)
or something much like it see Elga (2005), Feldman (2005), Christensen (2007, 2013),
Broome (2013, 98), Greco (2014), Horowitz (2014), and Titelbaum (2015).
4For defense of this see Worsnip (forthcoming), Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming), Little-
john (forthcoming a), Coates (2012), Weatherson (ms), and Wedgwood (2012).
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So, how do (ER), (ILC), and (PIF) generate a problem? Take any possible
situation in which (i) and (ii) of (PIF) obtain. From (PIF)(i) and (ER), it
follows that:
(A) S is rationally required to take D(p).
But from (PIF)(ii) and (ER) it follows that:
(B) S is rationally required to believe that her total evidence does
not support taking D(p).
But this runs up against (ILC). For (A) and (B) rationally require a combina-
tion of attitudes that (ILC)(ii) prohibits. So when (PIF) obtains one is both
rationally required and rationally forbidden to take an akratic combination
of attitudes towards a proposition. Some refer to this puzzle as the problem
of misleading higher-order evidence. I’ll just call it the PIF-Puzzle.5
Existing solutions to this puzzle involve denying (PIF),6 denying (ILC),7
and endorsing the existence of dilemmas of rationality–i.e. circumstances
where one cannot satisfy every demand of rationality.8 But these solutions are
difficult to maintain for, as Worsnip (forthcoming) has persuasively argued,
each of these solutions has costly drawbacks. Moreover, as Worsnip shows,
there is at least one independently motivated and unexplored solution to this
problem.
[[Another solution to this problems involves exploiting the distinction
between propositional and doxastic justification. I’ve argued elsewhere that
this offers an independently motivated and intuitive solution to the problem
of misleading higher-order evidence. I also think it offers a solution to the
5For other formulations of this puzzles or puzzles very closely related to this see Lit-
tlejohn (forthcoming a) and Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming).
6Feldman (2005), White (2007, 120), Huemer (2011), Greco (2014), and Titelbaum
(2015). Cp. Horowitz (2014).
7Coates (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming), Weatherson (ms), and Wedgwood
(2012).
8This is how Worsnip reads Christensen (2007, 2010, 2013).
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puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence that I develop below.
See my “How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading
Higher-Order Evidence” and the final comment of this paper for a bit more
detail.]]
2 Separating Epistemic Reasons from Epistemic
Rationality
Worsnip argues that when it comes to (ER) epistemologists have a lesson
to learn from the literature on practical reason, where many philosophers
distinguish rationality from reasons-responsiveness.9 For example, the kinds
of cases that motivate this distinction are cases where from the perspective
of the agent the balance of practical reasons support  -ing, when in reality
the balance of practical reasons support some activity that does not involve
 -ing. When an agent  s in such a case, she acts in a practically rational
way despite acting in a way that fails to be responsive to the balance of
practical reasons. Worsnip sees (ER) as conflating these distinct normative
statuses in the epistemic domain; in epistemology we need to differentiate
epistemic rationality from evidence-responsiveness. Thus, while (ILC) is a
genuine constraint on epistemic rationality, (ER) is not.
So Worsnip proposes we reject (ER) in favor of the following:
(ER*) If S’s total evidence supports D(p), then D(p) is the evidence-
responsive attitude for S to take.10
Without (ER) the PIF-Puzzle dissolves. For without (ER) we cannot get
(A) or (B) from (PIF)(i) and (ii). So the PIF-Puzzle is no puzzle at all.
9See Parfit (2001), Schroeder (2008, 2009, 2011), Gardner (2007), and Way (2009).
10Worsnip further cashes out evidence-responsiveness in the language of reasons: D(p)
is an evidence-responsive attitude to take iff D(p) is supported by the balance of one’s
evidential (=epistemic) reasons.
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(ER*) together with (PIF) just shows us that thinkers can be in the unfor-
tunate circumstance where evidence-responsiveness demands one take D(p)
while also believing that one’s total evidence doesn’t support taking D(p). Fol-
lowing one’s evidence in such cases will lead to irrationality, while obeying
the dictates of rationality will lead to a failure to respond correctly to one’s
evidence. Such circumstances are troubling and undesirable, but not impos-
sible. It’s just part of the epistemic life of cognitively limited creatures who
can be afflicted by misleading higher-order evidence.
It is a non-trivial virtue of Worsnip’s solution that it finds independent
motivation for rejecting (ER) in the literature on practical reason. For it
makes the rejection of (ER) more than the best of a bad set of choices;
rejecting (ER) is something we perhaps needed to do anyway.
3 Apparent Evidence and Coherence: the Con-
flict
Unfortunately the analogy with practical rationality comes back to bite. For
even though practical rationality does not depend on what practical reasons
there are, practical rationality does depend on what practical reasons there
are from the perspective of the agent. Whiting (2014, 3) gives an example:
Tom is suffering from an illness that, if not treated immediately,
will cause long-term damage. His doctor, Martha, holds a pill
that she believes would kill Tom were he to take it. The many
medical reports she has read and clinical trials she has conducted
appear to confirm this. ... However, due to an unusual quirk in
his physiology of which no one is aware, the pill will cure Tom.
According to the kind of view of rationality that has emerged in the literature
on practical reasons, this sort of case is one where the balance of practical
reasons support Martha giving the pill to Tom while it remains rational for
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her not to give the pill. For what Martha has practical reason to do is
grounded in, for example, the facts about the pill and Tom’s physiology; but
the rationality of her action is grounded in her perspective on those facts–a
perspective which is in fact mistaken. Just how one’s perspective on the facts
grounds rationality is a matter of controversy. But what is not a matter of
controversy is that it’s her perspective on the facts that determines what’s
rational for her to do.11
For convenience I’ll use the term ‘apparent reason’ in place of “reasons
there are from an agent’s point of view.” And since Worsnip (forthcoming)
analyzes evidence in terms of epistemic reasons, we can follow him and take
apparent epistemic reasons to be apparent evidence.
Now if we’re to think about rationality as a general phenomenon that
shares structural features across epistemic and practical (and certain other)
normative domains as Worsnip suggests, then just as practical rationality
tracks apparent practical reasons, epistemic rationality should track apparent
epistemic reasons, i.e. apparent evidence. Thus we have:
Apparent Evidence Requirement (AER). If S’s total
apparent evidence supports D(p), then rationality requires of S
that she takes D(p).
There is no inconsistency in the rejection of (ER) and the acceptance of
(AER) because (AER) concerns only apparent evidence, and apparent evi-
dence isn’t necessarily actual evidence. Rejecting (ER) and endorsing (AER)
represents a non-trivial shift in our epistemic ideology. For (AER) tethers ra-
tionality directly to apparent evidence, and only indirectly tethers rationality
to actual evidence insofar as they overlap.
11For example, the counterfactual analysis of practical rationality says (very roughly): it
is practically rational for S to   iff were what S believes true, it would give her a practical
reason to  . See Schroder (2007), Way (2009), Parfit (2001)). For a recent discussion of
this analysis see Whiting (2014).
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Other epistemologists have defended (AER) at length,12 drawing both
on the analogy with practical reasons and practical rationality as well as
the way in which (AER) can help explain internalist intuitions about the
positive epistemic standing of the beliefs of radically deceived thinkers (en-
vatted brains and the like). And this seems right. For while the radically
deceived cannot be responsive to actual evidence (so say many externalists),
they can be responsive to apparent evidence, and it seems as if that later
sort of responsiveness demands that one be credited with a rational belief.
(AER) elegantly explains that intuition. But one needn’t be an externalist
to appreciate (AER). For so long as an internalist does not deny that we can
sometimes be rationally mislead about what our actual evidence supports,
we will need (AER) or something like it to explain one’s rational beliefs in
such cases.13
At this point it’s easy to see where things are heading. For if (PIF) is
true, then we have good reason to think the following is true also:
Possibility of Apparent Iterative Failure (APIF).
It is possible that:
(i) S’s total apparent evidence supports D(p), while
(ii) S’s total apparent evidence supports believing that
her total actual evidence doesn’t support D(p).
The reason for thinking (PIF) supports (APIF) is that the same kinds of
paradigmatic examples that are used to support (PIF) also seem to support
(APIF). Consider the following case where (PIF)(i) and (ii) obtain:
12Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming b) and Kurt Sylvan MS. Cf. See Schroeder (2007:
Ch. 1) and (2008). Note that each of these authors use different terms in drawing the
distinction between reasons, apparent reasons, and rationality. For example, apparent rea-
sons (Sylvan) are also named “excuses” (Littlejohn) and “subjective reasons” (Schroeder);
while rationality is also named “excusability” (Littlejohn) and “substantive rationality”
(Sylvan).
13For example, mentalism (Feldman and Conee 2004) seeks to ground epistemic reasons
in one’s mental states, but that’s consistent with one lacking infallible access to what one’s
mental states are and what propositions one’s mental states support.
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Sherlock & Watson’s Nephew. Sherlock is a detective who
is famously good at assessing evidence. Sherlock has grudgingly
granted Watson the favor of allowing his nephew to be his ap-
prentice to see if he’s got a future in detective work. Sherlock
is repeatedly frustrated with Watson’s nephew because he reg-
ularly makes mistakes in his assessment of what the evidence
supports. The nephew’s errors have been frequent enough to give
the nephew good inductive evidence that he’s bad at assessing
the evidence. Sherlock has verbally confirmed this. While inves-
tigating their next crime scene Sherlock instructs the nephew to
assess the evidence and come to a conclusion about what it sup-
ports. Among the pieces of evidence Watson’s nephew comes to
know of is a high definition video of the murder caught on a secu-
rity camera. The recording provides conclusive (or near conclu-
sive) evidence that the butler committed the murder. However,
when Watson’s nephew next encounters Sherlock, Sherlock tells
the nephew that the evidence supports believing that the nanny
is the murderer. However, Sherlock only draws this conclusion
because he was never made aware of the video. And the nephew
never discusses the video with Sherlock because he assumes Sher-
lock is already aware of it and he is too ashamed of his past
failures to bring it up and ask Sherlock for further explanation.
Here is a case where the nephew’s total actual evidence supports:
(i) Believing that the butler did it, and (ii) believing that the
total actual evidence does not support believing that the butler
did it.
At least this is how it seems to advocates of (PIF).14 Advocates of (PIF)
will, for example, hold that the nephew’s knowledge of the video recording
14See Worsnip (forthcoming, section iv(b)) for a protracted defense of such cases in
support of (PIF) as well as the other references in footnote 4.
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is sufficient evidence to believe the butler is guilty. While it is Sherlock’s
testimony and the nephew’s knowledge of his own bad track-record that is
sufficient evidence to believe that the total actual evidence does not support
believing that the butler did it. So the above example is one kind of example
where (PIF)(i) and (ii) obtain.
It’s a short step from such instances of (PIF) to similar instances of
(APIF). For there can be overlap between apparent evidence and actual evi-
dence, and if there is such overlap in PIF-cases then the puzzle we began with
re-emerges. Of course, much turns here on what it takes to have sufficient
apparent evidence.15 Here are three different kinds of conditions implied by
prominent positions in the literature on apparent reasons:
(SAE: De Dicto) E is sufficient apparent evidence for S to take
D(p) IFF it appears to S that E is sufficient actual evidence to
take D(p).
(SAE: De Re) E is sufficient apparent reason for S to take D(p)
IFF (i) E’s truth would be sufficient actual evidence for S to take
D(p), and (ii) it appears to S that E.
(SAE: Treating) E is sufficient apparent evidence for S to take
D(p) IFF (i) it appears to S that E, (ii) S is attracted to treating
E like a sufficient objective reason to take D(p), and (iii) this
attraction manifests S’s relevant reasons-sensitive competence,
where a relevant reasons-sensitive competence is a competence
to treat E-like considerations like objective reasons to take D(p)-
like attitudes only if they are, when true, objective reasons to
take D(p)-like attitudes.16
15I’m grateful to the Inquiry referee who prompted me to consider this in greater detail.
16These can be inferred from the following, more general claims discussed by Sylvan
(2015):
(De Dicto) R is an apparent normative reason for S to   iff it appears to S
that R is an objective normative reason to  .
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Each view makes reference to ‘appearances’, which for present purposes may
be understood to include both doxastic states (e.g. belief-like states) and
non-doxastic states (e.g. seeming states).17
Both (SAE: De Re) and (SAE: Treating) imply that if there are PIF-cases
like the case of Watson’s nephew then there are also corresponding APIF-
cases. For Watson’s nephew’s actual evidence consists of, E1, the fact there
is a video recording of the crime being committed by the butler and, E2,
the fact that Sherlock has asserted that the total actual evidence supports
believing that the nanny is the murderer. But this is not merely sufficient
actual evidence for Watson’s nephew, it’s also sufficient apparent evidence
according to (SAE: De Re) and (SAE: Treating). For if this is a PIF-case,
then (SAE: De Re)’s condition (i) is fulfilled by the fact that E1 and E2 are
sufficient actual evidence to believe the butler is the murderer but that the
actual evidence doesn’t support believing that; and condition (ii) is fulfilled
by the fact that Watson’s nephew knows E1 and E2.18
(SAE: Treating)’s conditions are likewise fulfilled: (i) is fulfilled by the
fact that Watson’s nephew knows E1 and E2; (ii) is fulfilled by the fact that
he’s is attracted to treating E1 like a sufficient objective reason to believe the
(De Re) R is an apparent reason for S to   when (i) R’s truth would give S
an objective normative reason to  , and (ii) it appears to S that R.
(Treating) R is an apparent reason for S to   iff (i) it appears to S that R,
(ii) S is attracted to treating R like an objective reason to  , and (iii) this at-
traction manifests S’s relevant reasons-sensitive competence, where a relevant
reasons-sensitive competence is a competence to treat R-like considerations
like objective reasons to do  -like things only if they are, when true, objective
reasons to do  -like things.
Scanlon (1998: 25) and Kolodny (2005) appear to hold the de dicto view; Whiting (2014)
endorses a modified version of it. Parfit (2001, 2011), Schroeder (2007), and Way (2009)
appear to hold the de re view. Sylvan (2015) endorses a refined version of the treating
view, however the refinements don’t impact our present discussion. So I’ll work with this
simplified view.
17See Sylvan (2015) for further discussion of the relevance of including non-doxastic
seeming states in one’s account of apparent reasons.
18I assume here that any adequate view of appearances will imply that: if S knows that
P, then P appears to be the case to S.
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butler did it and also attracted to treating E2 like a sufficient objective rea-
son to believe that the total actual evidence doesn’t support that belief; and,
as is implicit in the case, (iii) is fulfilled by the fact that Watson’s nephew’s
attractions are grounded in his relevant reasons-sensitive competences. Be-
cause of this, (SAE: Treating) also implies that if this is a PIF-case, it’s also
an APIF-cases.
Does (SAE: De Dicto) imply that if Watson’s nephew is in a PIF-case
then he’s also in an APIF-case? Perhaps not. For part of what’s at issue in
thinking about apparent evidence for S is S’s first-person point of view, and
some think that the first-person point of view is not a point of view from
which we can appreciate PIF-cases. For example, Worsnip (forthcoming,
section 3) writes:
...the state of believing that one’s evidence does not support be-
lieving p, but nevertheless believing p, is harder to make sense of,
at least from a first-personal perspective. It amounts to saying ‘I
have nothing that gives any adequate indication to me that p is
the case; nevertheless, p is the case’. First-personally, these states
do not seem capable of withstanding serious reflection. And third-
personally, while we can imagine such agents, in describing and
explaining them we reach for some story involving self-deception
or a failure to recognize their own mental states.19
If this is right, then (SAE: De Dicto) is unlike (SAE: De Re) and (SAE:
Treating) in that it offers a way of endorsing (PIF) while rejecting (APIF).
I’ll return to this issue.
So here is where we are at. The problem from the previous section in-
volving (ER), (PIF), and (ILC) seemed to be neatly resolved by Worsnip.
19See also Gibbons (2014) and Foley (2001). Worsnip’s reference to the “first-person
perspective” is to be understood in terms of one’s belief ’s about one’s own situation, and
not the general sense we began with when we introduced the general notion of apparent
evidence.
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But the puzzle just resurfaces with (AER), (ILC), and certain prominent
views of apparent reasons that, together with (PIF), imply (APIF). For from
(APIF)(i) and (AER) it follows that:
(A) S is rationally required to take D(p).
But from (APIF)(ii) and (AER) it follows that:
(B) S is rationally required to believe that her total actual evi-
dence does not support taking D(p).
And as we’ve already seen, (A) and (B) conflict with (ILC)(ii). So the very
same puzzle of rationality remains even if Worsnip is correct that we must
reject (ER) and distinguish rationality from being evidence-responsive.
4 Moving Forward
One way of responding to the revived PIF-Puzzle is to follow Worsnip’s
divide-and-conquer strategy: just distinguish rationality from being apparent-
evidence-responsive and thus reject (AER) and introduce something like:
(AER*) If S’s total apparent evidence supports D(p), then D(p)
is the apparent-evidence-responsive attitude for S to take.
This is what some theorists are getting at when they draw a distinction
between substantive rationality and structural rationality–where being sub-
stantively rational has to do with being apparent-evidence-responsive and
being structurally rational has to do with avoiding attitudinal conflicts irre-
spective of whether or not it would be substantively rational for one to take
any of the conflicting attitudes (cf. Broome 2013; Scanlon 1998; Sylvan MS).
This kind of distinction might block the revived PIF-Puzzle.20
20I’m grateful to the Inquiry referee who prompted me to consider this issue.
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Accordingly, it would seem like there are two solutions to the revived PIF-
Puzzle. First one could draw the distinction between substantive and struc-
tural rationality and endorse something like (AER*), while rejecting both
(AER) and (ER) when the term ‘rationality’ is taken to refer to structural
rationality. Second, as discussed above, one could adopt (SAE: De Dicto)
and maintain that it cannot appear to oneself that one is in a PIF-case “in a
way that withstands serious reflection,” as Worsnip suggests. Both responses
seem to block APIF-cases, and without such cases there is no revived puzzle.
But there are reasons to worry about both ways of responding to the
revived puzzle. For drawing the distinction between substantive and struc-
tural rationality has an ad hoc flavor about it once we concede that there
are extremely clever, honest, and well-informed people who self-consciously
maintain beliefs that violate paradigmatic principles of structural rationality.
For example, consider the following claims:
(Contradiction) P is true, and P is false.
(Dilemma) I am rationally required to believe P and to not believe
P.
(Misleading) P, and my total actual evidence insufficiently sup-
ports believing P.
Pre-theoretically, the idea that one could rationally believe (Contradiction)
or (Dilemma) is at least as counter-intuitive as the idea that one could ra-
tionally believe (Misleading). This pre-theoretic judgement has led some to
think that structural rationality is, at least in part, a matter of avoiding such
combinations of attitudes. But it’s hard to spend time in conversation with,
say, J. C. Beall or Graham Priest, read their books and associated articles,
and then draw any other conclusion than that they are extremely clever,
honest, and well-informed people who rationally and self-consciously believe
(Contradiction) and (Dilemma) on the basis of their, at least, apparent evi-
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dence.21
But if Beall and Priest can rationally believe (Contradiction) and (Dilemma)
on the basis of their apparent evidence, then it’s hard to tell what relevant
notion of rationality the stipulative term ‘structural rationality’ refers to if
even these masters of the structural relations that obtain between proposi-
tions fail to be structurally rational. So rejecting (AER) and embracing a
division between substantive and structural rationality threatens to be more
of an illusive shift in topic than a genuine solution to the PIF-Puzzle. At the
very least, those who think that there is an important notion of structural
rationality that can be leveraged to reject (AER) and solve the PIF-Puzzle
need to justify their position vis-a-vis the present concern.22
These worries about structural rationality likewise affect those who might
seek a way out of the PIF-Puzzle by taking (SAE: De Dicto) and maintaining
that one cannot view oneself as being in a PIF-case “in a way that withstands
serious reflection.” For Beall and Priest are paradigms of people who ratio-
nally and self-consciously believe (Contradiction) and (Dilemma) in a way
that withstands serious reflection; and in describing them as such we do not
(or at least should not) reach for “some story involving self-deception or a
failure to recognize their own mental states.” But if it’s possible for them to
rationally believe (Contradiction) and (Dilemma) on the basis of their ap-
parent evidence, then it seems like the same should possible for (Misleading).
So even if (SAE: De Dicto) is correct, it’s not clear that it offers a way out
of the PIF-Puzzle.
In the introduction I began by citing the plausibility of (ER) and I later
acknowledged the plausibility of (AER). Both cannot be correct–assuming
that apparent evidence and actual evidence are not coextensive. So which
is right? I leave it to the reader to decide. For it does not matter for the
purposes of resolving the PIF-Puzzle. What matters is that either (ER) is
21See Beall (2009) and Priest (2005).
22For further development of the present concern with ‘structural rationality’ see
Lasonen-Aarnio (MS).
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true or (AER) is true. One can reject either one of these without disfiguring
our notion of rationality beyond recognition. But rejecting both is, arguably,
more than our ordinary way of thinking about rationality can bear. And
being stuck with one, whichever it is, is enough to enable the PIF-Puzzle.
So where do we go from here? In the end, there may be no ideal solution to
the PIF-Puzzle. Recall the existing responses to this puzzle: rejecting (PIF),
rejecting (ILC), or endorsing the existence of dilemmas of rationality. Going
a step further than Worsnip did, we can add two more possible responses.
First, the rejection of both (ER) and (AER) together with the introduction of
some theory of ‘structural rationality’ that is capable of plausibly responding
to the challenge above. Second, endorse some view of apparent evidence the
doesn’t entail the following: if there are PIF-cases, then there are APIF-
cases. The thing to observe is that each of these solutions has non-trivial
costs. In the end, there may be no good solution to the PIF-Puzzle.
[[One attempt to solve the PIF-puzzle that seems to avoid all the coun-
terintuitive consequences of the previously noted attempts involves drawing
a distinction between propositional and doxastic justification (construed in
terms of reasons-responsiveness). If that works, and if we can extend the
target notions of propositional and doxastic justification to rationality (con-
strued in terms of apparent reasons-responsiveness), then there is a promise
of an unproblematic solution to the APIF-puzzle discussed in this paper. See
Silva’s (2017) “How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Mis-
leading Higher-Order Evidence” for how the difference between propositional
and doxastic justification can help here.]]
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